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COMMENTS
ACES AND EIGHTS: WHY THE UNLAWFUL
INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT
ACT RESIDES IN "DEAD MAN'S" LAND IN
ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER CURB ONLINE
GAMBLING AND WHY EXPANDED
CRIMINALIZATION IS PREFERABLE TO
LEGALIZATION
Jonathan Conon*
The legalization of Internet gambling is a hotly contested issue among its
various supporters and detractors, despite the topic remaining in relative
obscurity within criminal law scholarship. Advocates for online poker are
particularly vocal in the belief that their activity should be exempt from any
form of a gambling ban. Recent academic articles, as well as current
legislative proposals, have in fact advocated for an environment where
Internet gambling is regulated and taxed by the federal government. This
Comment is intended to balance the Internet gambling debate by presenting
economic and social arguments against a legalization regime. It also
seriously questions whether Internet poker is deserving of an exemption
from a gambling ban. Before reaching these issues, this Comment surveys
the current focal point of Internet gambling law, the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, as well as other existing and proposed
gambling legislation. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that clearly
defining "unlawful Internet gambling" and then broadening the
criminalization of the activity to reach both operators and participants is a
preferable approach to proposals that callfor regulation and taxation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Is the ability of the citizenry to gamble legally on the Internet a right
that must be protected? Since the enactment of the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act' in October of 2006, the answer is no. But
Representative Barney Frank, along with at least fifty House cosponsors,
hopes to change this reality through the passage of H.R. 2267, the Internet
Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act.2 This
Comment attempts to distill the arguments both for and against using the
criminal law to control Internet gambling and ultimately concludes that a
stronger law, which reaches both operators and individual gamblers, is
necessary to address the serious concerns associated with the activity.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2006
The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)
was passed into law in an attempt to combat online gaming.3 The drafters
of the UIGEA cited a growing concern that debts stemming from Internet
4gambling would be uncollectable as a main reason for the Act's passage.
In addition to the issues surrounding uncollectible debts, concerns over
fraud, money laundering, and pathological and underage gaming were also
advanced as valid reasons for the law.5 The alleged inadequacy of current
law enforcement mechanisms to prohibit an activity that, by its nature,
crosses both national and state borders was also proffered as justification
for the UIGEA's passage.6
Despite the efforts of the drafters to address these evils, the UIGEA
fails to fully accomplish its objectives because of a lack of serious
31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
2 H.R. 2267, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
4 Id. at § 5361(a)(3). This fear grows out of the finding that states that chose to legalize
casino gambling saw a subsequent increase in the number of personal bankruptcy filings.
Kiran S. Raj, Comment, Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal Government Can
Work with the States to Regulate Internet Gambling, 56 EMORY L.J. 777, 793 (2006).
5 See Michael Blankenship, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act: A
Bad Gambling Act? You Betcha!, 60 RUTGERs L. REv. 485, 500 (2008).
6 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(4). Those with a less sanguine view of the law claim that the U.S.
government is trying to paternalistically control the morality of its citizens. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Tselnik, Note, Check, Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1622 (2007). Others posit that the government
only acted when it realized the magnitude of the tax receipts it failed to capture from the
online activity. See, e.g., Christopher Grohman, Reconsidering Regulation: A Historical
View of the Legality of Internet Poker and Discussion of the Internet Gambling Ban of 2006,
1 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 34, 64 (2006).
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enforcement.7 This result is not surprising considering that key terms of the
law, such as "unlawful internet gambling," are not clearly defined. 8
Additionally, the UIGEA includes numerous explicit exemptions that
suggest a comprehensive online gambling ban was not intended.9 Lastly,
the absence of a prohibition on individual gamblers leaves the supply of
online players virtually unaffected.10 These problems are briefly considered
below.
The UIGEA functions by prohibiting monetary transfers from
individuals involved in Internet gambling." However, the law does not
subject the individual bettor to criminal penalties,12 nor does it explicitly
prohibit all forms of Internet gambling. 13 Thus, one substantive problem
with the UIGEA is that a vague definition of "unlawful internet gambling"
has caused some to believe that particular areas of online gambling are still
legal.' 4  The Act defines unlawful Internet gambling as "plac[ing],
receiv[ing], or otherwise knowingly transmit[ting] a bet or wager by any
means which involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet
or wager is unlawful under any applicable federal or state law. ... ,
Instead of defining what constitutes illegal gambling, the UIGEA relies on
pre-existing state and Federal law, which it previously describes as
inadequate to handle the problem,' 6 as the source of a vital component of
the legislation.1 7  For this reason, proponents of online gambling,
particularly poker, continue to advance the position that some forms of
Internet gambling are still legal. 18
7 See Mark Aubuchon, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006:
A Parlay of Ambiguities and Uncertainties Surrounding the Laws of the Internet Gambling
Industry, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 305, 312 (2008).
8 See Blankenship, supra note 5, at 496.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 19-25.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 104-120.
11 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 486.




' 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (2006).
16 See supra text and accompanying note 6.
17 Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 306.
18 See, e.g., Poker Players Alliance FAQ #4, http://pokerplayersalliance.org/about/
faq/#faq7 (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) ("There is currently no federal law that prohibits
anyone from playing poker online. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006, does not change any federal gambling [law] and does not make it illegal for people to
play on the Internet.").
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A second substantive problem with the UIGEA is the number of
explicit exemptions it grants,19 which again reinforces the notion that some
forms of Internet gambling are legal. In particular, § 5362(1)(E)(ix)
excludes participation in a fantasy sports game or contest from the
definition of "bet" or "wager" so as to place these activities outside the
UIGEA's reach.20 Fantasy sports proponents believe their games rest on the
skill of the competitors, rather than on pure luck or chance, and thus are
deserving of an explicit exemption.2' The problem with this exemption and
others like it arises when advocates for borderline games like poker contend
that they, too, are deserving of a skill-based exemption.22
Another explicit exemption under the UIGEA that makes the status of
other types of Internet gambling unclear is the exemption for any activity
legal under the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA).23 In 2000, an amendment
to the IHA allowed for the placing of interstate wagers "via telephone or
other electronic media" where lawful in both states involved.24 Although
the Department of Justice maintains that this amendment does not make the
placement of horseracing bets on the Internet legal, their position seems to
be at odds with the language in the IHA.25 If Internet gambling on
horseracing is excluded from the confines of the UIGEA, proponents of
other forms of gambling have a stronger argument that further exceptions,
particularly for games with elements of skill like poker, are warranted.
As a result of these ambiguities and exemptions, recent Congressional
26proposals have attempted to amend and clarify the UIGEA. Most relevant
to this discussion are the Skill Game Protection Act, introduced by
Representative Robert Wexler in 2007,7 the Internet Skill Game Licensing
and Control Act of 2008, introduced by Senator Robert Menendez,28 and
'9 31 U.S.C. §§ 5362(1)(E), 5362(10)(C)-(E).
20 Id. § 5362(l)(E)(ix).
21 See, e.g., Jon Boswell, Note, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill that Is Implicitly Legal
Under State Law, and Now Explicitly Legal Under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1257, 1265 (2008).
22 See Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1619.
23 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D).
24 15 U.S.C. § 3002(3) (2006).
25 See I. Nelson Rose, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 537 (2006) (explaining how the Department of Justice
continues to argue its belief that the IHA does not legalize interstate gambling on
horseracing).
26 See Charles Doyle, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and Regulations Proposed for Its Implementation, 1, 6
(2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.corni/rpts/RS22749_20071101 .pdf.
27 H.R. 2610, 110th Cong. (2007).
28 S. 3616, 110th Cong. (2008).
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the recently introduced Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer
Protection, and Enforcement Act.29  This last bill, introduced by
Representative Frank, calls for the regulation and licensing of Internet
gaming, including online poker, as opposed to outright bans.30 Instead of
resorting to these options, Congress should choose to resolve the
uncertainties in the UIGEA by enacting a strengthening amendment that
specifically defines unlawful Internet gambling and criminalizes facilitation
as well as participation in the activity.
III. BACKGROUND
A. EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET
Measuring the size of the online gambling market is difficult, but it is
believed that the United States represents at least half of a market with total
revenues estimated to be between $7 billion and $10 billion in 2004. 1
Market revenues have been projected to reach over $24 billion by 2010.32
The growth in online gambling was caused, in part, by the rapid increase in
online poker play.33 From 2003 to 2005, online poker site revenue
increased from approximately $34 million per month to nearly $200
million.34
The popularity of online poker can be attributed to two main causes:
the explosion of televised live poker on numerous national networks,
including ESPN, NBC, and the Travel Channel, and the 2003 World Series
of Poker victory by "every-man" Chris Moneymaker, who won his entry to
the event through an online qualification.35  With the advent of
downloadable poker programs facilitating poker play through the Internet,36
experienced and novice gamblers were able to join in poker's popularity
without having to drive to often distant casinos.
29 H.R. 2267, 111 th Cong. (2009).
30 Tony Batt, Senate Bill Calls for Regulating, Not Banning, Online Poker, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Oct. 1, 2008, at 3D, available at http://www.lvrj.com/business/29991249.htmI.
31 Id.; see David 0. Stewart, An Analysis of Internet Gambling and Its Policy Impli-
cations, in AGA 10TH ANNIVERSARY WHITE PAPER SERIES, at 2 (Am. Gaming Ass'n 2006),
available at htp://www.americangaming.org/publications/10thanniversary series.cfm.
32 Lorraine Harrington, Note, Loaded Dice: Do National Internet Gaming Statutes
Violate World Trade Organization Fair Trade Access Standards?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 769, 769 (2007).
33 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 37.
34 Id.
" Id. at 36.
36 Id. at 37.
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B. LEGALITY OF POKER
Despite its appeal, poker is still against the law in most states.37 Those
who favor legalization advance arguments that the game is one of skill and
not of chance.38 At least one poker authority has claimed that the game
demands a greater skill set than that required for contract bridge or chess.3 9
Some of these advanced skills include:
(1) Ability to calculate precise mathematical odds of a needed card(s) coming on a
Turn or River... (4) Ability to read opponents['] behavior and body language to
accurately estimate the cards opponent was dealt ... (6) Ability to understand and
apply advanced strategic concepts such as semi-bluffing and playing for implied
odds.
40
One study attempted to quantify these skills and claimed that, at least
statistically, the amount of skill in poker dominates the amount of chance.4t
Not surprisingly, the case law surrounding the treatment of poker as a
game of skill is not as straightforward.42 Courts attempting to define poker
as a game of skill as opposed to a game of chance typically rely on either
the pure chance doctrine or the dominant factor test, with the latter being
preferred in most jurisdictions.43 A court will not find an activity to be a
game of skill under the dominant factor test "when an element of chance
dominates the distribution of prizes, even though such a distribution is
affected to some degree by the exercise of skill or judgment. 44 Put another
way, the dominant factor doctrine requires a court to determine where, on a
spectrum bookended by chance and skill, a particular activity falls.
45
Modem courts applying this doctrine have often declined to classify
poker as a game of skill.46 For example, in People v. Mitchell, the Illinois
Appellate Court upheld a jury's conclusion that a skill-based exception did
not apply to poker games.47 Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court found
in Charnes v. Central City Opera House Ass 'n that poker "constitutes a
37 See Bennett M. Liebman, Poker Flops Under New York Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2006).
38 id.
31 Id at 3.
40 Roman V. Yampolskiy, Game Skill Measure for Mixed Games, 27 PROC. WORLD
ACAD. Sci. ENGINEERING & TECH. 308, 309-10 (2007).
41 Id. at 311.
42 Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1662.
43 Id. at 1662-63.
44 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Roberts v.
Commc'ns Inv. Club of Woonsocket, 431 A.2d 1206, 1211 (R.I. 1981)).
45 Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1663.
46 See id. at 1664.
4' 444 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
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form of 'gambling' in its commonly understood sense" because of its
reliance on elements of chance. 48 Even states that have legalized poker,
such as California and Montana, have done so through specific statutory
language, not by finding that poker constitutes a game of skill.49 Judiciaries
in both states have routinely found that poker was a gambling game
containing elements of chance.50  A recent case from Pennsylvania,
however, took the opposite position. 51  The court in Commonwealth v.
Watkins used the predominance test to find that Texas Hold'em poker was
not "unlawful gambling" because it was a game dominated by elements of
skill.52
In spite of, or perhaps because of, this uncertainty in the state courts
regarding the legality of casino-style poker, gamblers flocked to the Internet
in droves to participate in the activity.53 One 2005 estimate placed nearly
100,000 people playing online poker for money during peak hours, with
nearly an equal number participating in free games.54 Although no single
reason motivated Congress to curb online gambling by passing the UIGEA,
the massive participation in online poker since 2000 was certainly not an
insignificant factor.
C. FEDERALISM CONCERNS
A logical question in the aftermath of the UIGEA's passage concerns
the right of the federal government to intervene at all, as gambling
regulation has traditionally been an area reserved for state supervision.55
The Supreme Court indicated a view in support of states' rights in United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. when it stated that gambling fails to
implicate a right that is constitutionally protected. 56 Rather, it is a vice
activity that states have a right to ban.57 In fact, under its police power, a
48 773 P.2d 546 (Colo. 1989).
49 Liebman, supra note 37, at 22.
50 Id.
51 Commonwealth v. Watkins, No. CP-19-CR-0000746-2008 (Pa. Ct. Corn. P1. Jan. 14,
2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/10915146/PA-Judge-Thomas-A-James-Jr-
Opinion-on-Commonwealth-of-PA-vs-Walter-Watkins-Texas-Holdem.
52 Id. at *14.
53 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 37.
54 Id.
55 Gerd Alexander, iBrief, The U.S. on Tilt: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act Is a Bad Bet, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 6, 7 http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/dltr/articles/2008DLTROO06.html.




state's authority to regulate gambling is nearly unchecked.18  These
federalism concerns, while certainly valid in the context of traditional
casino gambling within an individual state's borders, dissipate when
applied to Internet gambling. 9
Taking the unique position of advocating for federal intervention, the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) supported federal
regulation of Internet gambling. 6° NAAG recognized the need for a
national response to an activity that easily evaded regulation by any one
state.6 1 As one author noted, "[t]he jurisdictional uniqueness of the Internet
,62called for a national answer to online gambling." Proponents of
federalism can take solace from the fact that the UIGEA does not prohibit
intrastate Internet gambling, provided a state establishes mechanisms to
verify age and location. 63 This exception poses dangers of its own, which
are discussed at the end of Part VI.
D. PRECURSORS TO THE UIGEA
While arguably the furthest reaching federal response to Internet
gambling, the UIGEA is only the most recent Congressional attempt to
restrict the activity. 64 Precursors to the UIGEA included the Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 (IGPA)65 and the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Funding Prohibition Act. 66 Proposed by Senator Jon Kyl, the
IGPA attempted to impose penalties on individual bettors and would have
required Internet service providers (ISPs) to regulate online gambling.67
The bill died after a companion measure in the House received no action. 68
A toned-down version of the IGPA 69 again passed in the Senate during the
next Congressional session but also failed to find support in the House. 70
58 I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The International Law of Remote Wagering,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1159, 1173 (2007).
59 See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY
COMMIssIoN: FINAL REPORT 3-17, 5-9 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/reports/ffillrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC Final Report].
60 Id. at 5-9.
61 id.
62 Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal Government's Approach to
Internet Gambling, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 162, 167 (2009).
63 Id. at 172.
64 See Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1622.
65 S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997).
66 H.R. 2143, 108th Cong. (2003).
67 Stewart, supra note 31, at 18.
68 Id.
69 S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
70 Id.
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An approach to regulating online gambling that focused on restricting its
funding finally achieved a modicum of success late in 2002. 7'
Representative Jim Leach, who originally proposed a prohibition on
the use of credit cards in Internet gambling transactions in 2000,72
reintroduced the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act at
the beginning of the 108th Congress.73 H.R. 21 failed to make it out of the
House Judiciary Committee without substantial alteration, and a
replacement measure, H.R. 2143, was proposed that removed Judiciary
jurisdiction.74 The new bill eventually passed in the full House of
Representatives by a vote of 319-104.75 However, companion legislation S.
627, introduced by Senator Kyl, never reached a vote as certain exceptions
were amended to the bill.
76
Although many believed that an Internet gambling ban was not in the
cards after the Senate's failure to pass S. 627, two bills to this effect were
nonetheless introduced in the 109th Congressional session. 77 One measure,
H.R. 4777, reflected Senator Kyl's late 1990s ideas on ISP regulation. 78 A
second bill, H.R. 4411, was again introduced by Representative Leach and
was similar to his previous legislative attempts, with the exception of carve-
outs for fantasy sports and horse racing. 79 Although H.R. 4411 passed the
House in July 2006, it was not put up for a final vote until the last week of
the legislative session. 80  Ostensibly left for dead again, the Republican
Congressional leadership managed to squeeze the Internet gambling
legislation into the Safe Port Act as the UIGEA in the final three days of the
legislative session. 81 Accusations circled among Democrats that they never
even saw the final language of the gambling bill and were forced to vote for
it because of its inclusion with an essential national security measure.82
71 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 56.
72 Id. at 55.
7' H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003).
74 Stewart, supra note 3 1, at 19.
75 id.
76 id.
77 Grohman, supra note 6, at 57-58.
78 Grohman, supra note 6, at 58 (citing H.R. 4777, 109th Cong. (2006)).
79 Grohman, supra note 6, at 58 (citing H.R. 4411, 109th Cong. (2005)).
80 Id.
81 Id. The SAFE Port Act enhanced overall port security, improved security at port
facilities, and established a container security program. Jonathan K. Waldron,
Implementation of Safe Port Act Requirements, MAINBRACE, Dec. 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/Publications/0F160D 115C5E584B8EC553ED 137B3A
1A.pdf.
82 Id. at 58-59.
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E. IMPACT OF THE UIGEA
Despite its circuitous route into law, the UIGEA has had an impact on
the online gaming market. One of its most immediate effects was the
destruction in market value of many publicly traded companies in the
United Kingdom and Europe that serviced the U.S. market8 3 PartyGaming,
which operated the Party Poker site and generated 80% of its revenues from
the United States, lost $5 billion in market value as its stock plummeted
58%4 Similarly, Sportingbet, the operator of sportsbook.com and
ParadisePoker.com, dropped 60%, and The 888 Group, operator of
gambling site 888.com, fell 33%.85 Within one month of the UIGEA's
passage, Sportingbet sold its entire operation for one dollar.8 6 Another
online gambling provider, Pinnacle Sports, took three months to abandon
the U.S. market, leaving behind 60% of its customer base.
8 7
Online operators were not the only casualties of the UIGEA. Fearing
prosecution by the Justice Department, many financial providers abandoned
the U.S. market as well. 8 Neteller and PayPal, two of the leading financial
intermediaries used by online gamblers to fund their Internet accounts, have
stopped providing this service in the United States.8 9 They had been able to
generate profits because most credit card operators restricted individuals
from directly using their cards at online gambling sites.90 Companies like
Neteller allowed individuals to avoid this restriction by permitting the
transfer of money from credit cards to a company-operated holding
account.9 1 This account could then be used to fund a gambling site.92
Neteller made money by charging a nominal fee whenever a user withdrew
funds from the holding account back to a personal account.93 Neteller chose
to stop serving U.S. clients after two of its retired founders were arrested in
the Virgin Islands on money laundering charges stemming from their
company's role as a facilitator of online gambling.
94
83 See Alexander, supra note 55, 34; Mattia V. Corsiglia Murawski, Comment, The
Online Gambling Wager: Domestic and International Implications of the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 441, 443 (2008).
84 Grohman, supra note 6, at 60.
85 Alexander, supra note 55, 34.
86 Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 311.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 310.
89 Id.
90 Grohman, supra note 6, at 37-38.
9' Id. at 38.
92 id.
93 Id.
94 Alexander, supra note 55, 35.
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Despite these departures, U.S. players continue to find outlets for their
gambling dollars from online operators who pay little notice to the
UIGEA. 95 One such operator, Bodog, continues to accept wagers from U.S.
96 oteplayers for all its services, including poker and sports betting. Another
company, Fulltilt, claims to have experienced a profit increase of 600% by
remaining open to the U.S. market. 97  In addition to these recognized
names, other privately held e-casinos and electronic financial
intermediaries, known colloquially as e-wallets, have filled the void left in
the U.S. market after the departure of the aforementioned public
companies. 98 Their presence, free from shareholder oversight, may actually
be more harmful to players than the environment the UIGEA attempted to
regulate. 99 Moreover, it is likely that some operators who left the U.S.
online market will resume their operations if the UIGEA is not strongly
enforced.' 00 As U.S. players continue to gamble online, 10' a strengthening
amendment to the UIGEA that formally criminalizes all participation in the
activity appears necessary.
IV. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Justifying an expansion of the UIGEA under the criminal law requires
one to understand what the law does and does not say about Internet
gambling. First, the UIGEA specifically states that:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in
connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling (1)
credit or the proceeds of credit .... (2) an electronic funds transfer, . . . (3) any check,
draft, or similar instrument;... or (4) the proceeds of any other form of financialS102
transaction.
In essence, the UIGEA acts as a prohibition on monetary transfers from
individuals involved in Internet gambling.
10 3
A. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
One initial result of this language is that the UIGEA was not intended
to "make[] it a federal crime to merely place a bet on the Internet."'' 0 4 The
95 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 312.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Alexander, supra note 55, 34-35.
99 See id. 38-39.
100 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 312.
101 Alexander, supra note 55, 44.
102 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
103 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 486.
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phrase person "engaged in the business of betting or wagering" also appears
in the Wire Act' °5 and has been viewed as a high prosecutorial hurdle to
clear. 0 6 In United States v. Baborian, the defendant allegedly wagered up
to one thousand dollars per day several days per week and also offered his
own betting lines on games.'0 7 Nevertheless, the court found him not to be
engaged in the business of wagering or betting, and he therefore remained
outside of the criminal jurisdiction of the Wire Act.108
As various commentators have stated, the purpose of the UIGEA is to
greatly reduce the revenue flowing to illicit Internet gambling operations. 10 9
The government was allegedly not interested in prosecuting every five-
dollar bettor,"0 notwithstanding the repeated position of the Department of
Justice that Internet gambling is illegal.' 1' Efforts to prosecute individual
online gamblers are considered futile because of the difficulty of tracking
people in cyberspace. 12  Additionally, the focus of traditional law
enforcement has never been on the individual gambler." 3  The UIGEA
attempts to follow this path by targeting the intermediaries that facilitate the
transfer of money to and from those engaged in the business of wagering or
betting.114 Section 5366 imposes criminal penalties upon those institutions
that violate § 5363,115 which in turn defines the prohibited activity as the
104 Michael Grunfeld, Comment, Don't Bet on the United States's Internet Gambling
Laws: The Tension Between Internet Gambling Legislation and World Trade Organization
Commitments, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 439, 459 (quoting 1. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D.
OWENS, INTERNET GAMING LAW 4 (2005)).
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006). For more thorough treatment of the Wire Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 127-133.
106 See United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 331 (D.R.I. 1981) (explaining that a
defendant would need to be more than a gambling customer to qualify as engaged in the
business of betting; he would need to be involved in a financial arrangement with a
bookmaker, provide betting line information on a regular basis, and have this information be
relied upon by the bookmaker, all traits that Baborian failed to exhibit).
107 Id. at 326.
108 Id. at 331.
109 See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 26, at 1.
110 Grunfeld, supra note 104, at 459 (quoting I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS,
INTERNET GAMING LAW 4 (2005)).
111 The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10
(2006) [hereinafter DOJ Hearing] (statement of Bruce G. Ohr, Chief of Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
112 Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates
Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1593 (1999).
113 Id.
114 Tselnik, supra note 66, at 1617.
'" 31 U.S.C. § 5366(a) (2006).
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"acceptance of any financial instrument for unlawful internet gambling."' 16
The § 5366 penalties include fines and/or imprisonment for not more than
five years. 1
7
Pursuing the individual gambler at the expense of targeting an operator
or payment facilitator is undoubtedly a flawed approach." 8  Yet,
constructing a broader criminal law that reaches both gamblers and
operators and intermediaries may be necessary if targeting only the latter
proves ineffective.119 Depending on the balance of the social benefits and
downside costs that result from a broader rule, this approach may be
warranted in spite of a social consensus against targeting the individual
offender.12 0 In Part VIII, I will argue that online gambling presents such a
situation.
B. FEDERAL GAMBLING LAWS
A second issue arising from the UIGEA is that it does not define
"unlawful internet gambling."' 2 ' The text of the law expressly states its
intention not to "alter[], limit[], or extend[] any Federal or State Law...
prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.'
' 22
In a recent case challenging the UIGEA's validity, the Third Circuit
affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the claim that the phrase "unlawful
internet gambling" was unconstitutionally vague. 123 Appellant, Interactive
Media, needed to show that the law was "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications."' 124 The court acknowledged that the UIGEA did not, itself,
make any gambling illegal, but rather relied on the incorporation of existing
federal and state law. 25  Applying the Supreme Court's standard for
vagueness-"provid[ing] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
116 Id. § 5363.
" Id. § 5366(a).
118 See Keller, supra note 112, at 1593 (noting the difficulty of tracking individual
gamblers in cyberspace and advocating for controlling online gambling in the same manner
as its land-based counterpart: "at the source").
119 Cf Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1494
(2008) (explaining how in the case of heroin distribution, a state may choose a broader
criminal rule that punishes low levels of possession when it is unlikely that a narrower rule
would be able to sanction a well-organized dealer network).
120 Id. at 1506.
121 See Grunfeld, supra note 104, at 463.
122 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006).
123 Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 08-1981,
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19591, at *15 (3d Cir. Sept. 1., 2009).
124 Id. at *7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)).
125 Id. at *8.
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what is prohibited"-the court had little trouble accepting the fact that a
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could consult existing state and
federal provisions to understand which gambling activity was illegal. 26 A
review of some of the federal and state provisions that would trigger the
UIGEA's criminal provisions follows.
The Wire Act127 is generally considered to be the federal law most
applicable to online gambling.1 28 Passed in 1961, well before the advent of
the Internet, the Wire Act prescribes fines and penalties for those who,
engaged in the business of wagering or betting, "knowingly use[] a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers on any sporting event or contest .*.."1,29 An initial problem with
prosecutions under the Wire Act is that it, like the UIGEA, is limited to
persons "engaged in the business of betting or wagering. '' 130 Assuming this
hurdle can be cleared, authority is also split over whether all online
gambling-as opposed to just sports betting-is illegal under the Wire
Act. The government maintains the position that the act governs all
Internet gambling and continues to prosecute violators under its
provisions.132 Gambling proponents, such as the Poker Players Alliance,
interpret the Wire Act as limited to sports wagering and continue to lobby
against its extension. 33 Two cases, United States v. Cohen134 and In re
MasterCard, International Inc. (MasterCard)135 highlight this tension.
126 Id. at *7-9. The Third Circuit also refused to find fault with the fact that gambling
activity could be permitted in some states but illegal in others. Id. at *9. Nor was the court
concerned with the potential difficulty in determining the origin of a bet for purposes of its
legality, explaining that "[w]hat renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will
sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been
proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what the fact is." Id. at *10 (quoting
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1846 (2008)).
127 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
128 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 487; Rose, supra note 58, at 1166.
129 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 105-108.
131 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 307.
132 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 488.
133 See Poker Players Alliance, Updated Message to Members on SDNY Enforcement
(June 11, 2009), http://theppa.org/press-releases/2009/06/09/message-to-members-on-sdny-
enforcement-ppa-060909/ (stating that the Wire Act does not restrict any form of online
gambling other than sports betting).
134 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
... 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Cohen was one of the most publicized criminal prosecutions of an
online gambling operator under the Wire Act. 116 The defendant operated a
bookmaking business in Antigua known as the World Sports Exchange
(WSE). 3 7 WSE solicited customers from New York and other states who
would then wire money to the offshore location before placing sports bets
through the phone and Internet. 38  The Second Circuit upheld the trial
court's conviction of the defendant for violating the Wire Act.139 The court
reasoned that his intent to violate the statute was irrelevant considering that
he "knowingly transmitted information assisting in the placing of bets."'
140
Despite this victory, government attempts to use the Wire Act to reach
Internet gambling operators would incur a serious setback in the
MasterCard decision. 141
In MasterCard, the plaintiffs sought damages and tried to avoid
gambling debts they incurred through purchasing chips at online casinos
with their credit cards. 142  The plaintiffs alleged that the credit card
companies, including Visa and MasterCard, had engaged in violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by
facilitating illegal Internet gambling in concert with certain online
casinos. 143 To win on their RICO claim, the plaintiffs needed to prove that
two or more predicate acts, either state or federal crimes, had occurred.' 44
A Wire Act violation was one such predicate offense presented. 45  The
Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court's finding that "the Wire Act
concerns gambling on sporting events or contests."' 146  As the plaintiffs
failed to allege participation in Internet sports gambling, they could not use
the Wire Act as a predicate offense. 47 This omission led the court to affirm
the dismissal of their RICO claim, 48 and it also had broader implications
for the Wire Act's future use in prosecuting online gambling operators.
136 Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 431 (2006).
131 Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70.
13' Id. at 70-71.
139 Id. at 76.
140 Id.
141 See Tselnik, supra note 66, at 1627 (explaining how the MasterCard decision
contravened long-standing positions of the Department of Justice that the Wire Act banned
all forms of Internet gambling).
142 In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 259-61 (5th Cir. 2002).
141 Id. at 259-60.
4 Id. at 261-62.
141 Id. at 262.
146 Id.
14v Id. at 262-63.
148 Id. at 264.
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Online gambling proponents cite the MasterCard decision as evidence
that the Wire Act, and by extension the UIGEA, does not reach non-sports
related online gambling, especially poker. 49 No other circuit court has
ruled on this issue, but commentators generally agree that the Wire Act
represents insufficient authority for Internet gambling prosecutions beyond
sports betting.150 Notwithstanding these judicial and academic positions,
the government continues to rely on the Wire Act in attempting to curtail
gambling.151  Because the UIGEA fails to clarify any existing federal
gambling law, 52 the future application of the Wire Act to this area remains
uncertain.
Because of potentially limited applicability of the Wire Act,
prosecutors have also turned to the Travel Act 153 to restrict online gambling.
The Travel Act imposes criminal sanctions on "whoever travels in interstate
or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce, with intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful
activity .... ,,5 Unlawful activity encompasses "any business enterprise
involving gambling."' 55  Prosecutions under the Travel Act require the
government to clear a two-part hurdle, showing: (1) a violation of a state's
anti-gambling laws and (2) that the "mail or any facility" was used to carry
on a gambling activity. 1
5 6
The recent decision in United States v. Nader 57 may have important
implications for the second prong of this standard. The Ninth Circuit in
Nader held that not only was a telephone a facility in interstate commerce
for the purposes of the Travel Act, but also that wholly intrastate calls
undertaken to further an unlawful activity violate the Act. 158 Nader equates
149 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 45 (stating that the theory that the Wire Act applies to
gambling beyond sporting events is unlikely to win in court).
150 See, e.g., Grahmann, supra note 62, at 168; Rose, supra note 58, at 1167.
151 Dan Cypra, United States Federal Government Freezes $30 Million in Online Poker
Funds, POKER NEWS DAILY, June 9, 2009, http://www.pokemewsdaily.com/united-states-
federal-govermment-freezes-30-million-in-online-poker-funds-2830/ (explaining that in early
June 2009, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York froze nearly $30 million
in banking assets that belonged to online poker players, citing violations of the Wire Act and
Illegal Gambling Business Act).
152 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006).
1 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006).
's" Id. § 1952(a).
155 Id. § 1952(b).
156 Grohman, supra note 6, at 46.
157 542 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008).
158 Id. at 722. The court construed the statutory phrase "in interstate or foreign
commerce" as plainly modifying the word "facility" and not "use." Id. at 717-18. As the
telephone is a facility in interstate commerce, the court attached no significance to whether
the "use" was entirely intrastate. Id. at 719-20.
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intrastate and interstate transmissions so long as they are done to advance
an unlawful activity.' 59 Assuming a subsequent court applies this holding
to the Internet, 60 the issue of where an online transmission occurs would be
irrelevant. The government would then only need to prove a violation of a
state anti-gambling law to win a conviction under the Travel Act.'
61
A third federal law generally cited as applicable to Internet gambling is
the Illegal Gambling Business Act. 162  The law mandates fines or
imprisonment for those who "conduct[], finance[], manage[], supervise[],
direct[], or own[] all or part of an illegal gambling business."'163 A key
element of a prosecution under the Illegal Gambling Business Act is
proving that an operator violates an existing state law by running his
gambling business.'64 While this law only reaches gambling operators and
not individuals, it does implicate online gaming should a violation of an
existing state law be shown.
165
C. STATE GAMBLING LAWS
As the Illegal Gambling Business Act highlights, most federal gaming
laws were enacted to support existing state law on the subject. A search of
these laws reveals a range of regulations that are as varied as the states
themselves. 166  Some states, like Utah and Hawaii, prohibit gambling
altogether while others, such as New York and Wisconsin, limit gambling
to certain types of activities operated by the state. 167 Eight states have made
gambling through the Internet or the use of a computer illegal. 168 Although
the Third Circuit believes a person of reasonable intelligence can readily
ascertain from these laws which gambling activity is illegal, 69 others
rightly disagree.170 As one author has pointed out, the uncertain nature of
"' See 542 F.3d at 722.
160 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 46.
161 Id.
162 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006).
163 Id. § 1955(a).
164 Grohman, supra note 6, at 47.
165 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 491.
166 See, e.g., Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 315 (noting the varying approaches to gambling
regulation that exist among the fifty states); Grunfeld, supra note 104, at 468 (explaining that
"the legal status of gambling varies widely from state to state").
167 Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 316-17.
168 Id.
169 See Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., No. 08-
1981, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19591, at *8-9 (3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2009).
170 See, e.g., Dan Cypra, Internet Gambling Law Expert Reacts to UIGEA Decision,
POKER NEWS DAILY, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.pokemewsdaily.com/internet-gambling-law-
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state gambling laws and the absence of a uniform prohibition may allow the
re-entry of those online gambling operators that left the U.S. market after
the UIGEA's passage.
171
Beyond the concern of disparate laws, the application of the "dormant"
Commerce Clause provides a constitutional argument against leaving
Internet gambling regulation in the hands of the states. 72  This
jurisprudence prevents states from passing laws that interfere with the flow
of interstate commerce. 173 A key element of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis is that the affected commerce needs to be of a sufficiently national
nature. 174 The concern is that states in their legislative capacities will be
able to have a disproportionate extraterritorial effect beyond their fixed
boundaries. 175
Professor Dan Burk argues that the Internet, as a conduit for
transporting information, is similar to "previous interstate 'instruments of
commerce' such as railroads or trucks" covered under this analysis.
76
Other commentators believe that recent dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, particularly American Libraries Ass 'n v. Pataki,177
demonstrates that Internet gambling falls under this doctrine. 178 In striking
down New York's Internet Indecency Act, the court in American Libraries
equated the Internet with a highway or railroad because of its ability to act
"as a conduit for transporting digitized goods."' 179 It finished its analysis
with the far-reaching statement that "the Internet is one of those areas of
commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users
from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze
development of the Internet altogether."' 80 Online gambling regulation by
individual states presents a model situation for this type of "inconsistent
expert-reacts-to-uigea-decision-4664/ (explaining that relying on state law "may not be a
straightforward endeavor").
171 Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 317.
172 See Keller, supra note 112, at 1593-94.
173 Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1123-24 (1996).
174 See Keller, supra note 112, at 1593-94. States can derive an incidental local benefit
from an unequal treatment of domestic and out-of-state commerce if legitimate local
purposes are served by a regulation. Burk, supra note 173, at 1124.
175 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
343 (2002).
176 Burk, supra note 173, at 1125-26.
177 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
178 Keller, supra note 112, at 1594. But see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (disagreeing
with the conventional wisdom that the dormant commerce clause should invalidate state
Internet regulation).
179 969 F. Supp. at 173.
180 Id. at 169.
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legislation" due to the diversity of views on the activity. Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is necessary to ensure one set of rules
applies to all players.
V. ECONOMIC AND MORAL ISSUES
Beyond preserving the development of the Internet, application of the
dormant Commerce Clause to prevent a myriad of state Internet gambling
laws also stops a single state from imposing its moral viewpoint on the
entire landscape. 8 1 As much as Internet gambling proponents would likely
prefer for the will of North Dakota to shape cyberspace, 182 their opponents
would almost as surely opt for the more conservative legislation adopted in
Utah or Hawaii. 183 The social and moral questions raised by the spread of
gambling include potential increases in personal bankruptcies, pathological
and underage gambling, and state endorsement. An additional concern that
typifies the debate over legalized gambling is the amount of economic harm
that gambling inflicts on society.
184
A. ECONOMIC MULTIPLIER EFFECT OF GAMBLING DOLLARS
Economists posit that typical recreational dollars have a multiplier
effect once they enter the economy. 185 Stated in different terms, "normal
consumer spending benefits the economy by more than just the amount
spent." 86 Gambling proponents contend that money spent on gambling is
no different than recreational dollars spent at the theater or at a concert;
187
however, studies do not support this assertion. 188 For example, a 1998
analysis of Illinois casinos by the Regional Economics Application
Laboratory showed that the multiplier effect for casino dollars in the state
was 1.72.189 In other words, each dollar expended at a casino resulted in an
181 Keller, supra note 112, at 1594.
182 See Blankenship, supra note 5, at 512-13 (detailing North Dakota's attempt to
legislate the licensing and regulation of Internet poker and advocating it as a model for a
federal solution to the issue).
183 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 316.
184 See Blankenship, supra note 5, at 494.
185 John Warren Kindt, Diminishing or Negating the Multiplier Effect: The Transfer of
Consumer Dollars to Legalized Gambling: Should a Negative Socio-Economic "Crime
Multiplier" Be Included in Gambling Cost/Benefit Analyses?, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 281,
282.
186 Id.
187 See John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate
Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECIsION EcoN. 17, 19
(2001).
188 See id
189 Kindt, supra note 185, at 293.
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additional $0.72 worth of activity elsewhere in the state.190 As a point of
comparison, "most consumer dollars would have generated a dollar
multiplier effect of '2' to '3." ' '"9' Moreover, the financial benefits that do
accrue to society from traditional, land-based gaming cannot be replicated
in the context of Internet gambling.1
92
B. RISE IN GAMBLING-RELATED BANKRUPTCIES
An increase in uncollectable consumer debts 193 and the costs
associated with a rise in bankruptcies 194 are additional social concerns
linked to the spread of gambling. One study ranked legalized gambling as
"the third leading cause of individual bankruptcies in the United States."'
' 95
Bankruptcy costs from legalized gambling resulted in a cost of $40 per U.S.
household in 1997, and this figure is only expected to rise. 196 Moreover,
credit card use is a critical factor in the link between bankruptcy and
gambling.' 97 As nearly all Internet gambling is facilitated either directly or
indirectly through credit cards, 198 the legalization of online gambling would
likely exacerbate the problems of bankruptcy. 99 Lastly, the incidence of
personal bankruptcy due to gambling may suffer from underreporting 2°° as
few people admit publicly that gambling losses forced them to file. 20 1 The
190 Id.
191 Id. A similar study in Missouri produced nearly identical results and "seemed to
confirm the concerns of economists that legalized gambling activities constituted a net drain
on the consumer economy." Id. at 305.
192 See Grahmann, supra note 62, at 166. Even Representative Barney Frank, a noted
Internet gambling proponent, did not directly dispute the notion that the activity adds nothing
to gross domestic product. See Barney Frank, With Gambling, Personal Freedom Is Always
the Best Bet, Says Barney Frank, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 1, 2009,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/06/01/with-gambling-personal-freedom-is-
always-the-best-bet-says-bamey-frank.html.
"' See 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(3) (2006).
194 See NGISC Final Report, supra note 59, at 7-14 to -16.
195 John Warren Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's Destabilization of U.S.
Financial Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social
Norm Production, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 21, 29 (2002). According to the same study, legalized
gambling is also the fastest growing cause of consumer bankruptcy filings. Id.
196 Id.
197 See id. at 32.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
199 See Kindt & Palchak, supra note 195, at 30-31 (explaining that online gambling
through the use of credit cards falls into a category considered "the 'crack cocaine' of the
gambling industry because of its addictiveness and destructiveness.").
200 See Mary McCarty, Gambling's Critics Say Benefits Not Worth Cost, DAYTON DAILY




privacy and instant gratification afforded by Internet gambling 2°2 would
only further contribute to this problem.
C. PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING
Beyond the harmful effects associated with a rise in bankruptcies,
pathological gambling is an area of social concern that, while not unique to
the online environment, can be heightened by it.20 3 Countries, including the
United States and United Kingdom, have found that the immediacy of
gratification and high level of privacy afforded by the Internet can
exacerbate problem gaming.2 °4 This result is not surprising considering the
speed at which online gaming takes place.20 5 For example, where a poker
player typically sees thirty hands per hour at a live game, he can average
sixty to eighty hands per hour online, at one table.20 6 This rapid play can
result in the magnification of losses, especially where players have little to
no time to pause and assess their performance.
20 7
Currently, little research examining the behavior of Internet gamblers
exists.208 Two recent studies led by Harvard Medical School researchers
were among the first to analyze the actual gambling activities of Internet
users, as opposed to self-reported activities. 209 The study led by Richard
LaBrie (LaBrie Study) concerned online casino-style gambling while the
study led by Debi LaPlante (LaPlante Study) focused on Internet poker.21°
Relevant to this discussion is the researchers' confirmation of the existence
of a group of "most involved gamblers" representing 5% of total
participants."' In the LaBrie Study, this group wagered, on average,
approximately 8.5 times more per bet than the other 95% of participants
while making nearly 3 times as many daily bets.212 Similarly, in the
LaPlante Study, the most involved group wagered, in total, "at least 75
times more than the majority of the sample," although data on amount
202 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 501.
203 See NGISC Final Report, supra note 59, at 5-5.
204 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 501.
205 See Michael Smeaton & Mark Griffiths, Internet Gambling and Social Responsibility:
An Exploratory Study, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 49, 54-55 (2004).
206 Grohman, supra note 6, at 38-39.
207 Smeaton & Griffiths, supra note 205, at 54.
208 Richard A. LaBrie et al., Inside the Virtual Casino: A Prospective Longitudinal Study
ofActual Internet Casino Gambling, 18 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 410, 410 (2008).
209 Id.; Debi A. LaPlante et al., Sitting at the Virtual Poker Table: A Prospective
Epidemiological Study of Actual Internet Poker Gambling Behavior, 25 COMPUTERS IN HUM.
BEHAV. 711 (2009).
2 10 LaBrie et al., supra note 208, at 411; LaPlante et al., supra note 209, at 712.
211 LaBrie et al., supra note 208, at 413; LaPlante et al., supra note 209, at 713.
212 LaBrie et al., supra note 208, at 413 tbl.3.
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wagered per bet was not provided.2 13  While both groups of involved
gamblers had an average percentage loss that was less than the non-
involved group, the LaBrie group of most involved gamblers had an
average total loss of E8,746 (versus only E422 for the non-involved group)
and the LaPlante group had average net losses of E1,941 (versus only E587
for the non-involved group).214
Neither study concludes that the Internet is creating more pathological
gamblers than the traditional casino, and the LaPlante Study makes a
further point, noting that it "does not include information about rates of
clinical or subclinical gambling pathology., 21 5  Another researcher,
however, suggests that the potential for "problem gambling" is higher
among online participants than on-site gamblers, explaining that "the rate of
problem gambling among internet gamblers may be [ten] times higher than
the rate among the general population., 216 At a minimum, the combined
studies show the significant costs-in both dollars and the potential for
pathology-associated with online gambling.2" 7
D. UNDERAGE GAMBLING
A related social concern raised by lawmakers in the context of Internet
gambling is the inability of operators to restrict access to minor children
and young adults. 21 8 Age-verification technology has improved in recent
years, but it is still imperfect. 219 Lawmakers should be especially concerned
about the group of young adults, ages eighteen to twenty, who recently have
moved away from home. This group represents a key demographic for
online operators.220 And even proponents of online gambling concede that
213 LaPlante et al., supra note 209, at 714. The absence of data on the amount wagered
per bet is not surprising as poker players do not participate to the same degree in every hand
they are dealt.
214 LaBrie et al., supra note 208, at 413 tbl.3; LaPlante et al., supra note 209, at 714 tbl.1.
215 LaPlante et al., supra note 209, at 716.
216 Robert T. Wood & Robert J. Williams, Problem Gambling on the Internet:
Implications for Internet Gambling Policy in North America, 9 NEW MEDIA & Soc'y 520,
537 (2007).
217 See, e.g., LaBrie et al., supra note 208, at 414 (suggesting that interventions for
problem gamblers "need to target a range of behaviours and that identification of disordered
gambling behaviour needs to move beyond financially related consequences").
218 Hurt, supra note 136, at 423. Should a minor gain access to a gambling site, the issue
of financing may limit any resulting consequences. Teenagers often must share control over
a personal credit card or bank account with a supervising parent. Additionally, parents may
stand a better chance of discovering the illegal actions of their children when their children
live, and choose to gamble, at home. See id. at 424-25.
219 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 504.
220 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 37, 39.
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the arguments concerning the welfare of minors are more persuasive in the
context of this subset.221
Young adults, especially college students, are a vulnerable group
because they often possess access to credit cards with no parental
222supervision. These individuals tend to be unaware of the consequences
of abusing and mismanaging credit,223 while also lacking the impulse
control necessary to handle addictive behaviors, including gambling.
224
Internet gambling opponents are justified in raising social welfare concerns
regarding all underage gambling, in particular their focus on the
participation in the activity by this group of young adults.225
E. PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT ENDORSEMENT
Lastly, by refusing to explicitly ban Internet gambling, the United
States sets a social norm that condones the activity.226 If, however, the
federal government enacted an outright ban, a strong counter-signal would
be sent. Imposing a strict criminal ban on Internet gambling, even with
minor or no sanctions, likely would cause individuals to change their
behavior.227 People generally follow the law out of respect for the signal it
sends.228  The importance of the social norm set by the government is
seemingly ignored by those who argue that criminalizing individual
gambling activities would be a futile approach.229 Yet, the current tacit
endorsement of Internet gambling by the federal government in the absence
22 1 Hurt, supra note 136, at 425.
222 See Daniel G. Habib, Online and Obsessed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 30, 2005, at
66.
223 See So-hyun Joo et al., Credit Card Attitudes and Behaviors of College Students, 37
C. STUDENT J. 405, 416-18 (2003).
224 Pearson Liddell, Jr. et al., Internet Gambling: On a Roll?, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
315, 334 (2004).
225 The story of Greg Hogan presents just one troubling example of the harm that online
gambling can inflict on minors. Hogan, president of the 2008 Lehigh University
undergraduate class and son of a Baptist minister, was charged with bank robbery after
holding up a Wachovia branch for $3000. See Grohman, supra note 6, at 60-61. He claimed
that he had lost $5000 in online poker play and that his addiction caused him to rob the bank.
Id. at 61.
226 See Kindt & Palchak, supra note 195, at 32 (explaining that state endorsement of an
activity can have a significant effect on individual decision-making). This position would
align with the multitude of pro-gambling legislation that has occurred since the 1970s. Id. at
34.
227 See id. at 33-34 (detailing how new regulations can alter the existing social norm
associated with an activity).
228 Id. at 33. As one example, most people obey traffic laws even if minimal punishment
exists for violations. Id.
229 See Keller, supra note 112, at 1593.
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of a direct ban sends a disturbing signal considering the social problems
attached to the activity.
VI. PROPOSAL
An effective response to the problems of Internet gambling in general,
and the UIGEA in specific, should include the enactment of more stringent
legislation that makes online gaming illegal on an individual as well as on
an operator basis. This outcome would directly contradict several recent
Congressional proposals to modify the UIGEA, but would align with the
Justice Department's longstanding position that all Internet gambling is
against the law. An outright ban would also be a superior approach to
gambling legislation than what currently exists in Canada, one of the few
countries whose national criminal code contains specific provisions against
gambling by both individuals and operators.23°
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE UIGEA
While several bills to modify the UIGEA have been proposed in recent
congressional sessions, 231 none of them adequately address the flaws of the
existing legislation. Both the Internet Gambling Regulation and
Enforcement Act 232 and the Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax
Enforcement Act 233 seek to federally license online gambling operators.
Each bill also attempts to increase the amount of federal tax revenues that
are collected.234 The underlying motivation of the bills is sharing in the
billions of dollars of tax revenues that countries who license Internet
gambling collect.235 However, neither bill reduces the amount of online
gambling, although at least the Internet Gambling Regulation and
Enforcement Act promises to install safeguards to combat money• 236
laundering and fraud, protect minors, and assist compulsive gamblers.
A third measure, the Skill Game Protection Act (SGPA)237 would seek
further exemptions within the UIGEA and Wire Act for games of skill, a
term the drafters believe encompasses poker. The SGPA was influenced by
federal court decisions that interpreted the Wire Act "as applying only to
230 See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 206 (1985).
231 Doyle, supra note 26, at 1.
232 H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. (2007).
233 H.R. 2607, 110th Cong. (2007).
234 H.R. 2046, § 5381(a)(6); H.R. 2607, § 4491(7)(B).
235 H.R. 2046, § 5381(a)(4).
236 Id. § 5383(g).
237 H.R. 2610, 110th Cong. § 3(f) (2007).
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betting on sports." 238 Perhaps in anticipation of those in law enforcement
who would interpret the SGPA otherwise, Section 3 would exclude from
the definition of "bets or wagers" in the Wire Act "participation in
poker.., or any other game where success is predominantly determined by
a player's skill . ,,239 The SGPA would then amend § 5362(1)(E) of the
UIGEA to reflect in the definition of "bet or wager" the exclusion for
participation in games of skill now granted in the Wire Act.240  Again,
despite its inclusion of an array of potential safeguards against Internet
gambling harms, this proposal would do little to curb the amount of online
play.24 1
The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Clarification and
Implementation Act of 2008 (2008 Act)242 is one of the most informed
proposed amendments to the UIGEA. Initially, the 2008 Act recognizes the
lack of clarity in federal law as applied to non-sports related Internet
gambling, including poker.243 The 2008 Act also seeks to rectify the legal
uncertainty the UIGEA created for non-U.S. based entities. 244  It
specifically disclaims criminal liability for people who offered Internet
gambling services, excluding sports betting, before the UIGEA's enactment
but who ceased operations thereafter.245  The 2008 Act then explicitly
reaffirms criminal liability for those who offered illegal wagers to or
accepted them from individuals within the United States after the passage of
the UIGEA.246
Where the 2008 Act falls short is in its failure to clarify which bets or
wagers are illegal under federal law. In fact, the 2008 Act concludes by
stating that nothing in its contents should be read to imply that Internet bets
or wagers, other than sports bets or wagers, made after October 13, 2006 are
illegal under federal law. 247 After openly acknowledging confusion over
this subject in its findings section,248 the 2008 Act fails to further define
which bets are illegal under federal law. Therefore, its clarifications as to
criminal liability for Internet gambling are of questionable value, and
238 Id. § 2(5).
239 Id. § 3(f).
240 Id. § 5.
241 Id. § 4 (promising safeguards to combat money laundering and prevent fraud as well
as to protect minors and problem gamblers).
242 H.R. 6663, 110th Cong. (2008).
243 Id. § 2(a)(2).
244 Id. § 2(a)(5).
245 Id. § 2(a)(6).
246 Id. § 3(a).
247 Id. § 4.
248 See id. § 2.
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individuals are still left wondering which activities can be excluded under
the UIGEA.
H.R. 2267, the Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection,
and Enforcement Act, is the most recent attempt at reforming the
UIGEA. 249 Proposed by Representative Barney Frank, the bill would
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to grant licenses to Internet
gambling operators.2 Licenses would be conditioned on the satisfaction of
the usual list of safeguards against fraud, compulsive gambling, and
underage wagering.251 All licensees would also be required to comply with
any taxes imposed on their operations.252
B. A MODEL FOR A STRICTER GAMBLING LAW
Instead of granting further exemptions from the UIGEA for games of
skill or legalizing online play through a licensing regime, Congress should
expressly prohibit all forms of online gambling, a position that would also
clarify any existing uncertainty over prosecutorial actions of the Justice
Department. Since the Clinton administration, the United States Justice
Department has consistently maintained that all Internet gambling is
253prohibited. It supports this view based on its interpretation of the Wire
Act and continues to prosecute violators under it. 254  The Justice
Department cites concerns over underage and compulsive gambling, fraud,
and money laundering as reasons for its seemingly hard-line position
against online gambling.255 These issues are undoubtedly similar to the
safeguards that potential amendments to the UIGEA seek to address.256 The
24' H.R. 2267, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
250 Id. § 5383(a)(1)(B).
251 Id. § 5383(g).
252 Id. § 5383(g)(4). Opponents of the bill note that jurisdictions where gambling is
legal, such as Atlantic City and Las Vegas, have spent years developing and enforcing
effective regulations, whereas this bill would "direct the Treasury Department to set up a
new regulatory regime ... in a mere matter of months." Spencer Bachus, Online Gambling
Leads to Crime and Hurts Young, So Why Encourage It? Asks Spencer Bachus, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., June 1, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/06/0 1/online-
gambling-leads-to-crime-and-hurts-young-so-why-encourage-it-asks-spencer-bachus.html.
This criticism is particularly salient considering the immense responsibilities already placed
on Treasury in the wake of the nation's financial crisis.
253 Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1627; see also DOJ Hearing, supra note 111, 9.
254 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 489. In a 2006 case that pre-dated the UIGEA, the
Justice Department announced a $7.2 million settlement with the Sporting News over claims
that the company promoted illegal gambling. DOJ Hearing, supra note 111, 2. The
Sporting News was accused of advertising gambling in exchange for fees over a three-year
period. Id.
255 DOJ Hearing, supra note 111, 9.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 236, 241.
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Department of Justice nevertheless maintains the position that total
prohibition of Internet gambling, and not industry regulation, is necessary
to protect consumers from these ills. 257  Likewise, many state attorneys
general support an effective national Internet gambling law to combat the
activity in their respective jurisdictions. 8
Congress should empower these parties with a strengthening
amendment that provides criminal sanctions on both online gambling
operators and players. As a baseline for this sea change,259 Congress can
look to the prevailing interpretation of Internet gambling law set out in the
Canadian Criminal Code.26 ° In Canada, operators can be imprisoned for up
to two years for "sell[ing], barter[ing], exchang[ing] or otherwise
dispos[ing] of... any lot, card, ticket or other means or device for
advancing, lending, giving, selling or otherwise disposing of any property
by lots, tickets or any mode of chance whatever.' '26' While this Criminal
Code provision contains no explicit reference to online gambling,262 at least
one Canadian court has stated in dicta that online gambling is illegal in the
263
country. Many observers are also in agreement that individuals are
likewise prohibited from gambling online if the website is located in
another country.264 According to the Criminal Code, any person who
"buys, takes or receives a lot, ticket or other device.., is guilty of an
offence punishable on summary conviction., 265 The United States should
improve upon Canada's approach of criminal liability for Internet gambling
and not adopt the exemption existing in Canadian law that still allows their
citizens to wager, on average, $447 per person. 266
Because legal authority over gambling regulation in Canada is split
between the federal and provincial governments, if a provincial government
conducts or manages a gambling activity "operated on or through a
computer, video device or slot machine," then that government exercises
authority over any criminal penalties resulting from the activity. 267 Two
conditions need to be met for Internet gambling to be legal in Canada: the
257 See Hurt, supra note 136, at 433-34.
258 See Bachus, supra note 252, at 2.
259 Over fifty nations have legalized and regulated Internet gambling. H.R. 2046, 110th
Cong. § 5381(a)(3) (2007).
260 See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 206 (1985).
261 Id. § 206(1)(b).
262 Wood & Williams, supra note 216, at 521.
263 UniNet Techs. Inc. v. Commc'n Servs Inc., [2005] B.C.C.A., 114, 1 (Can.).
264 Wood & Williams, supra note 216, at 521.
265 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 206(4).
266 Harrington, supra note 32, at 769.
267 Id. at 784 (quoting Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 207(1)).
2009] 1183
JONATHAN CONON
service must be (1) "operated by the provincial government" and (2)
"restricted to the residents of the province offering the service. 268 These
requirements have proven difficult to implement.
In Earth Future Lottery,269 the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a
lower court ruling that found the Province of Prince Edward Island to be in
violation of the Criminal Code by planning to conduct an Internet lottery.
The proposed lottery was open and marketed to individuals beyond the
confines of the province, including citizens of the United States, through the
use of computers and the Internet.270 The court saw this as a fatal flaw
under the Criminal Code even though the transactions related to the lottery,
as well as the server on which the site operated, were alleged to be housed
entirely within the province.2 While the precedential value of this
decision is likely limited to the operation of an Internet lottery, the court
noted that the provisions of the Criminal Code "clearly demonstrate that
Parliament does not happily abide gaming activities of any sort in
Canada .... The purpose of Parliament... was generally to outlaw
gaming and lotteries, not just to ensure they would be run honestly. 272
The U.S. Congress should adopt a similar posture in criminalizing
online gambling at the federal level without allowing for exemptions for
individual states.273 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission
cited the ease with which online patrons could conceal their location within
the United States in order to gamble with a foreign-based operator.274 The
approaches to country concealment that the Commission highlighted,
including a process where a patron first dials into a remote ISP to give the
appearance of being located in a jurisdiction where online wagering is
legal,275 seem readily applicable to intra-U.S. gambling as most ISPs are
local carriers. A similar problem would arise if states differed in the legal
gambling age they set for their operations. Even legalization proponents
admit that existing technology cannot yet accurately verify age online.
276
These logistical hurdles offer few assurances that virtual state boundaries or
regulations could be respected.
268 Id.





273 See supra text accompanying notes 266-267.
274 NGSC Final Report, supra note 59, at 5-10.
275 Id. at 5-10 to -11.
276 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 504.
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But beyond the burdens on a state to prohibit non-residents from
partaking in state-authorized Internet gambling, there is the added question
of whether these desires would even exist. The authority to operate Internet
gambling sites may cause some states to "race to the bottom" in an effort to
capture a larger share of the tax revenues claimed to accompany legalized
gambling.277 A similar result occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s
when states began authorizing riverboat casino gambling.278 Initially, strict
restrictions were in place: boats could not be stationary and were limited in
their hours of operation.279 In some instances, players' losses were also
capped. 280  But once additional states started competing for gambling
patrons by authorizing their own riverboats, these restrictions were
gradually lifted.8 1 Moving boats begat stationary casinos and eventually
riverfront properties were established.282 A similar rush to maximize
potential online tax revenue suggests some states have the incentive to offer
minimal regulation of age and location, or at least provide less stringent
enforcement mechanisms.
VII. POLICY DEFENSES
A. PRESENCE OF NEGATIVE GAMBLING EXTERNALITIES
The arguments justifying an outright federal ban on Internet gambling
include a reduced economic multiplier effect from expended consumer
dollars, a potential rise in bankruptcies and pathological gaming, and a
heightened risk of underage gambling.283 Internet gambling also poses a
risk that various forms of fraud will be perpetrated against individual
284players. A chief concern of the federal government is that online
operators may unfairly take a player's money or wrongly disseminate his or
her personal information.285 This issue is particularly salient in light of the
277 See, e.g., H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. § 5381(a)(6) (2007) (claiming that licensing and
regulation would provide additional tax revenues to the United States); Blankenship, supra
note 5, at 506 ("Taxing the Internet gambling industry is a great opportunity for a significant
growth in tax revenues.")





283 See generally discussion supra Part V.
284 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 500-01.
285 Id. at 501.
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discovery of the two largest cheating scandals in the history of Internet
gambling, both of which occurred on poker sites.286
Players on web sites AbsolutePoker.com and UltimateBet.com were
victims of scandals where cheaters hacked the companies' software and
defrauded players out of $1.6 million and $20 million, respectively.287 The
cheaters had manipulated the system so that they could see the face-down
cards of their online opponents, which is a virtually unbeatable
advantage.2 8 The scandals were only discovered upon the concerted effort
of individual players acting as analytical detectives as the companies were
either unable or unwilling to respond to allegations of a scam.289 While the
sites are now refunding money to the victimized players, the scandal raises
legitimate questions as to the integrity of the online gambling system,
particularly poker.290 A comprehensive online gambling ban would remove
from participants' minds any tacit endorsement of the legitimacy of Internet
29gambling sites by the U.S. government. 291 It would also put players on
sufficient notice that they are participating in an illegal activity that the
government believes is pervaded by fraud.
A related concern is the ability of criminals to use online gambling
sites to launder money. An individual with an ill-gotten gain can deposit
the money into an online account, gamble a de minimus amount, and then
request a withdrawal of a now legitimate "winning." 292  Proponents of
online gambling claim that this situation is not unique to the operation of
betting web sites and in fact pervades electronic commerce.293 While there
is truth to this statement, an Internet gambling site does provide an easy
mechanism by which money can be moved electronically. 294 Simply
making a criminal's nefarious intentions harder to execute should serve as a
sufficient justification for restricting an economic activity that otherwise
acts as a societal drain.295
28 Gilbert M. Gaul, Players Gamble on Honesty, Security of Internet Betting, WASH.





290 Id. Internet poker also subjects participants to a further risk of collusion among the
other players at the virtual table-a form of fraud absent from other variants of Internet
gambling. Grahmann, supra note 62, at 177.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 226-229.
292 Hurt, supra note 136, at 427.
293 Id. at 428.
294 Blankenship, supra note 5, at 503.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 185-192.
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B. IMPROPRIETY OF EXEMPTING ONLINE POKER FROM A
COMPREHENSIVE GAMBLING BAN
Supporters of exempting online poker from the confines of the UIGEA
downplay all these externalities and claim that regulation is still a preferred
solution.296 They contend that poker is a game of skill deserving of an
exclusion from any outright gambling ban.297 Proponents also point to the
tremendous financial windfall to the United States from a decision to
regulate and tax Internet gambling.298 These advocates are misguided for
three reasons. First, online poker should not qualify as a game of skill
deserving of an exemption. Major skill elements of the activity in its
traditional form, including the ability to read one's opponent, precisely
299
calculate mathematical probabilities, and implement complex stratagems,
are diminished in the online context. As these skill elements diminish, the
relative importance of chance increases. Second, while the activity may not
be as dependent on chance as other forms of online gambling, one can
easily imagine how the twenty-four hour, seven day a week nature of the
Internet casino makes poker a "gateway activity" to other, more
pathological games. Lastly, as few economic revitalizations have actually
occurred in cities that opened commercial casinos, 300 one needs to strictly
scrutinize the claims of online gambling proponents concerning the
financial benefits of regulating and taxing the activity.
30 1
The argument that poker constitutes a game of skill has yet to find
wide support in the legal system.302 Moreover, major skill elements of the
game are diminished in the online context. One critical skill element
present in poker occurs in the context of reading the opponents against
whom you are playing.30 3 In an analysis of the elements of chance and skill
present in various gambling activities, Professor Christine Hurt places
296 Grohman, supra note 6, at 66-67.
297 Tselnik, supra note 6, at 1619.
298 Grohman, supra note 6, at 68.
299 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
300 Dreyfuss, supra note 278, at 31-32.
301 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 68 (discussing the "massive windfall from tax
revenue" that the United States could generate by taxing Internet gambling while also
describing that other countries have recognized similar results). However, it is unclear
whether these financial projections include the full cost, both economic and social, of
legalizing and taxing Internet gambling. See generally discussion supra Part V.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
303 Hurt, supra note 136, at 382; Liebman, supra note 37, at 4 (quoting professional
poker player Mike Caro as stating that "psychology becomes the key ingredient in separating
break-even players from players who win consistently. The most profitable kind of poker




poker to the right of blackjack on the chance/skill spectrum for this reason,
noting the importance of being able to effectively bluff one's opponents as
well as not divulging one's own strategy. 304  Two-time World Series of
Poker champion Doyle Brunson notes that "[m]ore than any other game,
poker depends on your understanding your opponent."30 5
The ability to gather psychological and social information from one's
opponents is greatly reduced in the online environment.30 6 There are far
fewer visible clues, or tells, that an experienced player can ascertain from a
weaker player's table demeanor.30 7 Online poker players are forced to
resort to tracking software that records a particular player's betting history
and displays wagering tendencies.30 8 Although this resource can provide
information otherwise unavailable to a traditional poker player, it can be
largely unhelpful because of the ease with which online players exit and
enter games.309
The speed at which online poker occurs also inhibits players' abilities
to accurately respond to complex table decisions. 310 In an online poker
game, one simply has far less time to play a given hand.31 Online operator
PokerStars quantifies this time allotment on its website as follows:
At PokerStars, a player in a ring (non-tournament) game is allotted 25 seconds to act
on their hand if it is a fixed limit poker game, and 35 seconds in a pot limit or no limit
poker game. A warning message is displayed in the chat box when there are 15
seconds left to act.
312
This compressed decision making schedule compares to the virtually
unlimited time one has to act in a traditional poker game. The ability to
304 Hurt, supra note 136, at 382.
305 Scott A. Golder & Judith Donath, Hiding and Revealing in Online Poker Games, in
PROCEEDINGS OF ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 370,
370 (2004) (quoting DOYLE BRUNSON, SUPER SYSTEM: A COURSE IN POWER POKER (3d ed.
2003 [sic])).
306 id.
307 See id. at 373.
308 See, e.g., Poker-Edge.com, Dramatically Increase Your Poker Profits By Stalking
Your Opponents' Play, http://www.poker-edge.com/index.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
309 See Golder & Donath, supra note 305, at 372 (describing how players can enter and
exit an online poker game "virtually instantly" during times when there is a wait to join the
game).
310 See Arthur S. Reber, One for the Old Guys: Reaction Times, Decision Times and
Memory, http://www.pokerlistings.com/poker-strategy/one-for-the-old-guys-reaction-times-
decision-times-and-memory (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (detailing the speed of online poker
and describing the increased time pressure players face in this environment).
311 See, e.g., Topl5Poker.com, Play Poker Online to Improve Your Game,
http://www.topl5poker.com/Online-poker.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
312 PokerStars.com, Poker Games Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.pokerstars.com/poker/room/faq/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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patiently think through a decision can be a valuable resource in a highly
involved hand, although the casino can implement a maximum time limit
for taking action.313 Players do attempt to use the speed of the online game
in combination with the opportunity to simultaneously play at multiple
games to maximize their profit potential.314 However, in doing so they
usually must sacrifice the ability to "respond to moves against them in a
thoughtful manner., 315  Even after considering these differences between
online and traditional poker, the contention that online poker still deserves a
UIGEA exemption is further assailable when one evaluates the potential
"gateway" nature of the activity.
The term "gateway" is regularly found in the context of narcotics and
applies to a relatively less dangerous drug, like marijuana, that leads users
to more invidious substances, such as PCP. 316 By analogy, participation in
the relatively non-speculative nature of online poker may lead to more
pathological gambling due to the nature of the online casino.317
Because a typical Internet casino offers games ranging from poker to
blackjack to slot machines, 318 a dedicated poker player could easily
encounter and participate in another gambling activity simultaneously with
his or her poker experience. This temptation does exist at a traditional
casino, but the physical impracticalities of running between the roulette
wheel and the poker table, for example, severely limit this occurrence.
Online, a regulatory body would need to incur considerable monitoring
costs to allow a site to provide poker capabilities, but restrict a player from
other forms of gambling. The difficulty of ensuring that online sites only
offer poker, coupled with the earlier discussion on the potential for
313 See PlayWinningPoker.com, Clock--Call for the Clock,
http://www.playwinningpoker.com/poker/terms/clock.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (stating
that "[i]n both casino tournament poker and ring games, players normally have no set time in
which they must act on their hand"). Some online operators, including PokerStars, do have a
"time bank" that players can access if they need additional time to make a difficult decision.
However, these "time banks" are typically only for tournament play and cannot be
replenished during the event once they are depleted. See, e.g., PokerStars.com, supra note
312. Moreover, it is questionable whether a player gets sufficient time to act even when
using a "time bank." See Reber, supra note 310.
314 Ashley Adams, Jiujitsu Against the Multi-Tabling Online Poker Player, POKER MAG.,
Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.pokermagazine.com/Online-Poker/jiujitsu-Online-Poker
multipletables.html.
315 Id.
316 See, e.g., Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 931 (9th Cir. 2001).
317 See Hurt, supra note 136, at 417 (citing others' concerns over the harm to players
presented by the "virtually unfettered access" to gambling that online casinos offer).
318 Stewart, supra note 31, at 2.
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pathological gaming in the online context,319 should give pause to those in a
position to grant online poker a UIGEA exemption.
Lastly, proponents of legalizing Internet gambling cite impressive
estimates for the tax revenues that would result from regulating the
activity.120 One estimate claims that a flat Internet gambling tax of 6.25%
could produce over $750 million in annual revenue. 32' Even legislators are
quick to point out the potential for the United States to share in the billions
of dollars in global tax receipts that the industry produces.322 These claims
share a striking resemblance to the justifications many states proffered for
initiating or expanding land-based gambling activities within their borders
in recent years.323 Afraid to raise taxes, many legislatures looked to
gambling taxation as a way to overcome budget deficits and pay for
important services.324  Gambling taxation became a politically expedient
way to raise money, notwithstanding opposition from business leaders and
325citizens.
Unfortunately, economic revitalizations tend not to materialize.326 One
study that analyzed nineteen years of gambling data found that the opening
of a large-scale casino resulted in a decrease in sales tax revenues in eight
of twelve analyzed states.327 This result is not surprising considering the
reduced economic multiplier effect observed in states with legalized
gambling. 328 Forecasting a similar result should legalized online gambling
begin to compete for consumers' disposable income dollars seems
reasonable.
The issue of tax collection presents a final obstacle to overcome.
Proponents of regulation admit that the government would face substantial
monitoring and compliance costs,3 29 and these costs need to include an
effective collection system. Receiving all gambling taxes owed by
319 See discussion supra Part V.
320 See, e.g., Gaul, supra note 286, at Al (explaining how advocates for overturning the
UIGEA see regulation resulting in millions of dollars of tax revenues).
321 Grohman, supra note 6, at 68.
12 See H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. § 5381(a)(3) (2007).
323 Dreyfuss, supra note 278, at 28.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 32.
327 Id. at 31-32. Four of the eight states that lost sales tax revenues did offset this loss
through "sufficiently high wagering taxes on [the] casinos." Id. at 32. However, the
problems of collecting high taxes, especially in the Internet context, need to be thoughtfully
considered. See infra text accompanying note 329.
328 See supra text accompanying notes 185-192.
329 Grohman, supra note 6, at 69-70.
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commercial casinos has at times proven difficult,330 and the complexities of
the Internet would only magnify this collection problem. In view of these
concerns, the rose-colored claims of Internet gambling proponents on the
massive tax potential of the industry need to be more seriously scrutinized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Online gambling, once left for dead, has the strong potential to
resurface in the United States. 331 Key provisions of the UIGEA, such as
"unlawful internet gambling," remain vague, 332 and the number of explicit
exemptions the law grants suggests that more could be forthcoming.333 The
introduction of H.R. 2267 by Representative Frank further portends the
onset of licensed Internet gambling. This Comment urges Congress to turn
away from the idea of legalization and taxation and instead proposes a two-
step solution to address the problems of the UIGEA in its attempt to combat
Internet gambling.
First, Congress needs to amend the UIGEA with a comprehensive
definition of "unlawful internet gambling" and explicitly limit the
exemptions granted under the law. In this way, the legislature can make
most forms of Intemet gambling illegal on an operator level.334 A
strengthening amendment would provide law enforcement officials the
unambiguous tool they need to combat Internet gambling,335 while also
avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with prosecuting operators under
the Wire Act.336 Lastly, a clear federal ban on Internet gambling would
remove much of the uncertainty currently existing in state law on the
subject.337
Second, Congress should take the broader step of amending § 5363 of
the UIGEA to excise language that requires a person to be "engaged in the
business of betting or wagering" for criminal liability to attach. Making
Internet gambling illegal on an individual basis should not be viewed as an
unprecedented step when one looks to the prevailing interpretation of the
330 Dreyfuss, supra note 278, at 31.
331 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 312-13.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17. But see supra text accompanying notes
123-126 for the Third Circuit's view on the constitutional vagueness of "unlawful Internet
gambling."
333 See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
334 A broad ban on Internet gambling would harmonize with the strict restrictions
established for the online purchase of alcohol and cigarettes-two other vice activities long
associated with gambling. See Grahmann, supra note 62, at 163.
335 DOJ Hearing, supra note 111, 1.
336 NGISC Final Report, supra note 59, at 5-7; see supra text accompanying notes 149-
152.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 166-171.
2009] 1191
JONA THAN CONON
Canadian Criminal Code, 338 assuming that no state-based exceptions were
also included. Adding another criminal sanction will undoubtedly trigger
discussion of the over-criminalization that purportedly exists in the United
States.339 However, when the criminal law cannot otherwise reach an
activity deserving of punishment, a broader extension of liability may be
warranted.34 °
Internet gambling is the paradigmatic example of this type of activity.
Efforts targeting the operators of online sites will only go so far as long as
the potential to earn millions of dollars from recreational and problem
gamblers exists to counteract the threat of prosecution.341 Additionally, the
ability to enforce criminal penalties on international operators and
intermediaries is severely constrained when few of them ever set foot on
U.S. soil.342 In evaluating this type of situation, the benefits of an overly
broad law, in this case one that reaches individual gamblers, should be
weighed against its attendant costs.
343
This Comment demonstrates that online gambling provides, at most,
minimal benefit to society. Pathological and problem gaming can be
heightened in the online context, bankruptcies and uncollectible debts may
rise, and the potential for fraud, money laundering, and underage gambling
are at least as great as in the traditional gambling context. The alleged tax
revenues that will flow to society can readily be called into question, and
the demonstrated multiplier effect on the economy from gambling dollars is
considerably less than from other forms of recreational spending.
Furthermore, despite the claims of scholars who criticize any attempt to
target individual bettors, circumstantial evidence exists that criminalizing
the activities of the "five-dollar bettor" may increase the percentage of
otherwise law-abiding citizens who stop gambling online. According to the
estimate of former U.S. Federal Reserve advisor Edward Kane, 30% of
online gamblers were law abiding citizens who stopped gambling after the
UIGEA was passed.344 By extending the prohibition under the UIGEA to
the individual level, a larger percentage of the citizenry is likely to
withdraw from the online gambling community. Of course, no level of
prohibition or sanction will ever stop those with a determined mind to
gamble. Yet, criminalizing both the supply and the demand of Internet
338 See supra text accompanying notes 259-266.
339 Buell, supra note 119, at 1492.
340 Id. at 1493-94.
341 See Aubuchon, supra note 7, at 312.
342 See Grohman, supra note 6, at 51-52.
343 Buell, supra note 119, at 1506.
344 Dominic Walsh & Tom Bawden, Bankers and Players in America Hedge Their Bets
on Internet Law, TIMEs (London), Oct. 3, 2006, at 44.
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gambling by making most forms illegal on an operator as well as on an
individual basis is the surest way to achieve the desired results of the
UIGEA.
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